Ownership concentration, top management and board compensation



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Marcos Barbosa Pinto
Ricardo Pereira Câmara Leal

Abstract

The degree of ownership concentration may influence executive and board compensation (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003). This article analyzes this relationship. Detailed information about top management and board compensation became available starting in 2010 through new Securities Commission filings. Linear regression models applied to a sample of 315 Brazilian companies traded on the national exchange indicate a negative and statistically significant economic correlation between executive compensation and the degree of ownership concentration. Ceteris paribus, companies with a lower degree of ownership concentration pay higher compensation to top executives. Family controlled companies pay more to their chief executive, but not to the managerial team as a whole, and the compensation of directors increases with a greater proportion of control group members or their relatives on the board. There was support for the Managerial Power Hypothesis in companies with a lower degree of ownership concentration and for the extraction of private benefits in companies where it is greater.

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How to Cite
Pinto, M. B., & Leal, R. P. C. (1). Ownership concentration, top management and board compensation. Journal of Contemporary Administration, 17(3), 304-324. https://doi.org/10.1590/S1415-65552013000300004
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