O dilema cooperação-competição em mercados concorrenciais: o conflito do oligopólio tratado em um jogo de empresas



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Antonio Carlos Aidar Sauaia
David Kallás

Abstract

The dilemma faced by oligopolistic price-taking companies was studied - tacit cooperation profit-oriented (collusion) or aggressive price competition market-oriented. The results obtained by an experiment based on a Business Game (MMG) produced raw data from a seven-firm oligopoly studied for four years. The descriptive analysis based on Industry Attractiveness, Microeconomic Analysis, Game Theory, and Stakeholders Analysis showed that competition destroyed value for investors (profits were transformed into losses and company share prices fell 23%) and for the government (less taxes). In contrast, 22% more consumers were able to buy 22% more products 10% cheaper, the number of distribution centers and sales representatives grew twice as much, 21% more computers were produced, 13% more employees were hired, and 63% more investments in technology (R&D). The results suggest that to neutralize the negative effects of competition and promote sustainable economic growth it is suitable for firms to practice legal ways to engage in coopetition and create a) superior attractiveness for the industry, b) social orientation by improving wages, creating and maintaining jobs, along with c) support for the economy's development with better products, higher GDP and taxes, and strengthening consumer wrights.

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How to Cite
Sauaia, A. C. A., & Kallás, D. (1). O dilema cooperação-competição em mercados concorrenciais: o conflito do oligopólio tratado em um jogo de empresas. Journal of Contemporary Administration, 11(spe1), 77-101. https://doi.org/10.1590/S1415-65552007000500005
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Author Biographies

Antonio Carlos Aidar Sauaia, Universidade de São Paulo Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade Departamento de Administração

Livre-docente em Política de Negócios pela Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade (FEA) da Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Professor no Departamento de Administração da FEA/USP. Coordenador do Projeto de Pesquisa SIMULAB. Suas áreas de interesse em pesquisa são simulações organizacionais e aprendizagem vivencial

David Kallás, Universidade de São Paulo Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade; Ibmec São Paulo; Associação Nacional de Executivos de Finanças, Administração e Contabilidade

Mestre em Administração pela Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade (FEA) da Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Professor do Ibmec São Paulo e Vice-presidente da Associação Nacional de Executivos de Finanças, Administração e Contabilidade (Anefac). Suas áreas de interesse em pesquisa são gestão da estratégia, balanced scorecard e jogos de empresas