The Regulation of the New Bidding Law: Definition of the Institutional Logic Prevalent in a Field

Abstract

Objective: the present research analyzes how regulatory definitions occur in a field, in which participants defend multiple logics in the public procurement of large-scale engineering works and services, with a focus on the requisition of guarantee insurance. It also discusses a take-back clause and the percentage of the contract value to be insured. Theoretical approach: this work is part of the discussion about how an institutional logic is constituted, given the competition between multiple logics in a field. Method: the research is focused on discussions relevant to the field. Data collection was carried out through a documentary survey of the analysis of speeches in Congress, as well as interviews with relevant actors in the field using a semi-structured script. Results: the conflicts between logics are resolved through combinations with elements from other field logics. They emphasize the power of actors’ coalitions to define regulatory issues. The study, thus, pointed out how the participants managed to reduce the influence of the logic defended by the insurance market, in favor of the interest of construction companies in the drafting of the project, showing that different market logics can contradict one another. Finally, elements exogenous to the logic under construction are fundamental in its formulation. Conclusions: the theoretical contribution of the study indicates that the institutional logic that becomes prevalent in a complex field is the result of the imposition of a coalition of actors combining elements from distinct logics. However, the coalitions may be different for each of the questions examined.

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