Anti-Corruption Enforcement and Organizations: A Narrative Review

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Robson Fernandes Soares orcid
Edson Ronaldo Guarido Filho orcid


Context: in the administration literature, it is possible to identify several occurrences of the term enforcement, mainly related to studies of corruption. These mentions, however, are not uniform and often refer to different types of the phenomenon. In addition, they occur without connection to regulation studies, in which enforcement is a central concept. Objective: the objective of the present study is to identify the types of anti-corruption enforcement present in the administration literature in the light of the regulatory literature. Methods: we carried out a reflective thematic analysis on 31 articles in the administration area, selected in the Web of Knowledge database and published until 2017, in which corruption and enforcement appear in a related way. Results: at the end of the analysis, it was possible to identify four types of occurrence of the term in the literature: punitive, market, competitive, and cultural enforcement. These four types have unique characteristics in the light of the regulatory literature. Conclusions: the identification of types of anti-corruption enforcement contributes to differentiate the many ways in which the term is used in the literature. Furthermore, as a study of a typological nature, it offers a way to develop new theories, as well as to carry out empirical studies.


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Soares, R. F., & Guarido Filho, E. R. (2021). Anti-Corruption Enforcement and Organizations: A Narrative Review. Journal of Contemporary Administration, 25(6), e190149.


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