Operation Car Wash: Impacts on the Executives' Liability Insurance Market
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Abstract
Context: triggered in 2014, the Car Wash Operation (CWO) belongs to a process of changing the legal context, in the sense of greater responsibility and penalization of public and private companies’ decision makers for acts practiced in the exercise of their functions, object of the Directors’ and Officers’ liability insurance coverage (D&O). Objective: to evaluate the relationship between the growth in the revenues of D&O insurance premiums and the developments of the OCW in Brazil, under the hypothesis of a change in the perception of economic agents exposed to risks covered by D&O insurance, in a process known as probability updating. Methods: official monthly data for all active insurers, arranged longitudinally between 2003 and 2017, and using two-stage regression method for panel data. Results: the OCW had a positive effect not only to the probability of offering this type of insurance, but also to increase the volume of D&O premiums; these results are consistent with the probability-updating hypothesis. Conclusion: the OCW resulted in an increase in revenues of D&O premiums, but there was a negative relationship between OCW and the entire insurance market, suggesting significance of this operation in the sector retraction observed since its outbreak.
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