Executives Compensation and Performance in Family and Non-Family Brazilian Companies



Main Article Content

Ilse Maria Beuren
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4007-6408 orcid
Edgar Pamplona
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2579-5458 orcid
Maurício Leite
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7764-3969 orcid

Abstract

Objective: in order to produce new insights for the knowledge about the effects of executive compensation on companies, relationship between performance (short-term) and investment policy (long-term) in Brazilian family and non-family companies listed in Brazil, Bolsa, Balcão (B3) are investigated. Methods: documentary procedure research was conducted with data from Economática® and company reports (Management Report, Reference Form and Explanatory Notes). The sample of 87 companies consists of 48 family and 39 non-family companies. Results: indicate that the short-term variable remuneration is related to the performance and investment policy of the companies, while the long-term variable remuneration was not significant. Short-term variable compensation reveals potential to maximize corporate performance, with a stronger impact on non-family companies. In view of the investment policy, short-term variable compensation presents a negative relation, but this effect is reverted to non-family companies. Conclusion: executive compensation can be a governance mechanism to align the interests of the parties, both in family and non-family companies. However, its precise dimensioning must consider the type of ownership and corporate management.



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Beuren, I. M., Pamplona, E., & Leite, M. (2020). Executives Compensation and Performance in Family and Non-Family Brazilian Companies. Journal of Contemporary Administration, 24(6), 514-531. https://doi.org/10.1590/1982-7849rac2020190191
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References

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